Does the Type of Material Information Matter to CEO Turnover?
Abstract
Using hand-collected data to obtain the nature of material information, I examine whether and how the likelihood of CEO turnover is associated with material information disclosures. I find the likelihood of CEO turnover increases following different types of material information announcements. Further, I partitioned the sample into the various stages of company life cycle in order to determine whether life cycle stage affects the relationship between the disclosure of material information and CEO turnover. The results show that the disclosure of material information by companies only in maturity and decline is associated with high CEO turnover.
Submission of an article implies that the work described has not been published previously (except in the form of an abstract or as part of a published lecture or academic thesis), that it is not under consideration for publication elsewhere, that its publication is approved by all authors and tacitly or explicitly by the responsible authorities where the work was carried out, and that, if accepted, will not be published elsewhere in the same form, in English or in any other language, without the written consent of the Publisher. The Editors reserve the right to edit or otherwise alter all contributions, but authors will receive proofs for approval before publication.
Copyrights for articles published in MTI journals are retained by the authors, with first publication rights granted to the journal. The journal/publisher is not responsible for subsequent uses of the work. It is the author's responsibility to bring an infringement action if so desired by the author.
